STEMM Institute Press
Science, Technology, Engineering, Management and Medicine
Legal Regulation of Algorithmic Overtime Penalties for Food-Delivery Riders
DOI: https://doi.org/10.62517/jel.202614515
Author(s)
Chengbin Bao
Affiliation(s)
School of Law, China Jiliang University, Hangzhou, Zhejiang, China
Abstract
In the digital economy, algorithmic overtime penalties for food-delivery riders have formally receded after the new national standard, but platforms have replaced fines with points systems and still indirectly affect riders’ income by restricting order access and imposing mandatory training, the substance of the economic penalty remains unchanged. This study examines whether such penalties have a valid legal basis and whether existing regulatory tools can effectively constrain platform-set penalty rules. Using doctrinal and institutional analysis, it first discusses the legality of overtime penalties and then analyzes the effectiveness and limitations of current legal regulation. The study finds that riders are in incomplete labor relations; although labor laws should not apply in full, rules concerning labor intensity and remuneration should still be subject to labor-law constraints. Current penalties ignore causes of delay and lack genuine rider participation, rendering appeals formalistic, while fragmented responsibility and ex post supervision make the core problem difficult to correct. Effective legal regulation should focus on algorithmic transparency, substantive consultation, and effective appeals. Only by constraining platforms’ rule-making power can the substantive economic penalty behind points systems be effectively regulated.
Keywords
Food-Delivery Riders; Algorithmic Time Penalties; Incomplete Labor Relations; Algorithmic Transparency
References
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