Can Short-Selling Mechanism Improve Corporate Audit Quality?
DOI: https://doi.org/10.62517/jel.202614517
Author(s)
Shuzhou Zhang
Affiliation(s)
School of Economics and Management, Nanchang Hangkong University, Nanchang, Jiangxi, China
Abstract
To examine the causal effect of short-selling on corporate audit quality, this paper exploits the staggered rollout of China’s margin trading and securities lending program as a quasi-natural experiment. A panel dataset of A-share listed firms on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges spanning 2011–2024 is constructed, and a staggered difference-in-differences (DID) specification is employed for causal identification. In China’s institutional context, short-selling is implemented exclusively via the securities lending leg of the margin trading system.The empirical findings demonstrate that short-selling eligibility markedly lowers the absolute magnitude of discretionary accruals (|DA|), consistent with enhanced audit quality. The estimated coefficient on the Short indicator is –0.010 and reaches statistical significance at the 1% level. A placebo test supports the causal interpretation of these results, while alternative robustness procedures-replacing the dependent variable with audit opinion or using the one-period lag of Short-yield directionally consistent but statistically insignificant estimates. Subgroup tests reveal that the improvement in audit quality driven by short-selling is significant for clients of both large and non-large audit firms, with each subgroup registering a coefficient of –0.011. No statistically meaningful difference emerges between the two groups.The governance role of short-selling is moderated by state ownership. Specifically, the audit quality gains are more pronounced among non-state-owned firms, as confirmed by a significant interaction term at the 1% level.This paper contributes to the literature on the economic effects of short-selling and the drivers of audit quality. It also offers firmlevel evidence to inform the refinement of margin trading and securities lending rules and the strengthening of audit regulation.
Keywords
Short-Selling Mechanism; Audit Quality; Margin Trading and Securities Lending; Staggered DID Model; State Ownership
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