Legal Challenges in the Transition of the Central Ecological and Environmental Protection Inspection System to Routine Oversight and Measures for Its Improvement
DOI: https://doi.org/10.62517/jel.202614525
Author(s)
Miaoxin Zhang
Affiliation(s)
English Major, Huizhou University, Huizhou, China
Abstract
The Central Ecological and Environmental Protection Inspection is a major institutional innovation in China’s ecological civilization construction; however, in practice, it still faces the dilemma of “campaign-style governance,” and its legal causes and paths to improvement require further exploration. This paper employs text analysis and follows a “problem-dilemma-causes-pathways” framework to conduct the research. The study finds that the obstacles to transitioning to a routine system manifest in the absence of legal responsibilities, insufficient stability of the regulatory order, and a dualistic normative system; the underlying legal causes lie in divergent orientations toward legal interests, the absence of procedural norms, a lack of long-term mechanisms, a breakdown in the chain of power transmission, and the hollowing out of referral mechanisms. Based on these findings, this study proposes improvement pathways, including establishing a rule-of-law framework for balancing legal interests, filling gaps in procedural norms, promoting the statutory operation of oversight powers, improving long-term mechanisms for collaborative governance, and deepening the Institutionalization of Internal Regulations. By systematically analyzing the obstacles to this transition from a legal-theoretical perspective, this study offers new theoretical insights and practical approaches for transforming the oversight system from a campaign-style approach to routine supervision, providing valuable insights for the development of an ecological and environmental governance model with Chinese characteristics.
Keywords
Central Ecological and Environmental Protection Inspection System; Campaign-Style Governance; Routine Oversight
References
[1] Li Yao. The Logical Origins, Operational Mechanisms, and Development Pathways of the Central Ecological and Environmental Protection Inspection System [J]. Research on Internal Regulations, 2024, 3(1): 54–67.
[2] Luo Sanbao, Du Bin, Sun Pengcheng. A Retrospective and Outlook on the Central Ecological and Environmental Protection Inspection System [J]. China Environmental Management, 2019, 11(5): 16–19.
[3] Wang Guangliang, Huang Xin, Hu Xiaoyan, et al. The Central Ecological and Environmental Protection Inspection System: Implementation Outcomes, Identification of Issues, and Policy Recommendations [J]. Ecological Economics, 2023, 39(2): 201–206.
[4] Ji Pengfei. On the Rule of Law in the Central Ecological and Environmental Protection Inspection System: Focusing on the “Provisions on Central Ecological and Environmental Protection Inspection Work” [J]. Environmental Protection, 2019, 47(14): 27–32.
[5] Jiang Yating, Du Yanqiang. How Do Central Ecological and Environmental Protection Inspections Drive Local Ecological and Environmental Governance Outcomes? - A Long-Term Process Tracking Based on the Governance of Lake Daihai [J]. Management World, 2023, 39(11): 133–152.
[6] Cui Jing. “Campaign-Style Response”: Strategic Choices in Policy Implementation in Grassroots Environmental Governance-A Case Study of Town Y in North China [J]. Journal of Public Administration, 2020, 17(4): 32–42+166.
[7] Cao Fengzhong. An Analysis of the “Campaign-Style” Law Enforcement Model in Environmental Protection [J]. China Environmental Rule of Law, 2007, (): 129–132.